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RECENT DECISIONS
hearing. Secondly, and collaterally, the
principal case might strongly influence the
state's decision as to when it is necessary
to appoint counsel to defend an accused
indigent. The broad holding of Escobedo
v. Illinois25 (that the accused has a right
25 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
"Allen Charge" Used
in Absence of
Deadlocked Jury
Appellant was convicted of stealing from
the mails, forging and uttering Government
checks, and conspiring to commit the al-
leged acts. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing in
part and affirming in part, held that the
supplemental charge given the jury after
their deliberation for approximately four
and one-half hours did not go beyond the
permissible "Allen charge,"' and there-
fore, did not constitute reversible error.
Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22
(5th Cir. 1965).
Whenever the jurors, at early common
law, were given the task of deliberating
upon the evidence and reaching a verdict,
they usually were not discharged until they
'Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
The charge permitted in Allen instructs the mi-
nority juror to examine the questions submitted
to him with a proper regard for the conclusion
of the majority; he need not, however, necessar-
ily acquiesce in that conclusion.
to counsel when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory) obviously
creates a constitutional right to counsel
long before the trial. Thus, to protect it-
self against unforeseen contingencies, the
state may be forced to provide counsel for
the indigent even before the constitution
requires it.
had reached a verdict.2 The purpose of
keeping a jury together was twofold: (1)
to keep the individual jurors free from im-
proper influences;3 and (2) to coerce
agreement among the jurors.' To assure
the success intended, the jurors were
placed in the charge of a sworn officer of
the court, without food, drink or fire (with
the exception of candlelight).5 If they did
not agree before the court adjourned, they
were carried around in a cart until a ver-
dict was "bounced out."'
In the United States, this common-law
practice was followed until 1851, when the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Commonwealth v. Tuey 7 upheld the fol-
lowing charge which was read to a jury,
after a reported deadlock:
2Shoukatallie v. R., 3 All E.R. 996, 1000
(1961).
3 McHenry v. United States, 276 Fed. 761, 763
(D.C. Cir. 1921).
4 Ibid.
5 Shoukatallie v. R., supra note 2; accord, Mc-
Henry v. United States, supra note 3.
631 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1964); accord, Mc-
Henry v. United States, supra note 3.
7 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851).
although the verdict to which a juror agrees
must of course be his own verdict, the re-
sult of his own convictions, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fel-
lows, yet, in order to bring twelve minds
to a unanimous result, you must examine
the questions submitted to you with can-
dor, and with a proper regard and defer-
ence to the opinions of each other.8
This charge, though it has fomented great
differences of opinion as to its merit, did
effect a milestone - if a minority juror
could not agree with the majority because
of his own conscientious convictions as to
the situation at hand, the resulting mistrial
would be accepted and acknowledged by
the court.
Although the charge was not immedi-
ately approved and employed by the courts
of all the states, it did receive some recog-
nition and approval. In 1881, the Connec-
ticut Supreme Court, in State v. Smith, 9
agreed with the use of the charge. In 1896,
the United States Supreme Court approved
of a charge taken literally from Tuey and
Smith in the case of Allen v. United
States.10 It is from this case that the charge
received its now famous (or infamous)
name, the "Allen charge."
In its approval of the charge, the Su-
preme Court stated:
it certainly cannot be the law that each
juror should not listen with deference to
the arguments and with a distrust of his
own judgment, if he finds a large majority
of the jury taking a different view of the
case from what he does himself.'1
The object of the jury system is to ar-
rive at a true verdict through unanimity.
This can be done only by deliberation, mu-
8 Id. at 2.
9 49 Conn. 376 (1881).
10 Supra note 1, at 501.
11 Allen v. United States, supra note 1, at 501-02.
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tual concession and due deference to the
opinions of each juror by the others. 12 If
this end is to be achieved the court must
have the authority and ability "to present
to the minds of the dissenting jurors a
strong motive to unanimity."' 13 One effec-
tive method of presenting such a motive to
the dissenting jurors has evolved from situ-
ations similar to that in Allen. After an ex-
tended period of deliberation by the jury,
resulting in the report of a deadlock, the
court gives a supplemental instruction. This
supplemental instruction is, in essence, the
"Allen charge.' 14
The Supreme Court in Allen fixed cer-
tain limits which must not be transgressed,
and certain standards which must be com-
plied with, if the supplemental instruction
is to be allowed.15 The court may impress
the jury with the length of time which the
trial has taken, the expense to the parties,
the importance of the case and the signifi-
cance of an agreement. 16 However, if there
is any pressure by the court which appears
to coercively urge an agreement, no matter
how subtle, it is an unwarranted infringe-
ment on the function of the jury.17 A most
effective means for preventing the latter is
the stringent requirement that the court
must emphasize, in its supplemental in-
12 Commonwealth v. Tuey, supra note 7, at 4;
accord, Allen v. United States, supra note 1, at
501-02.
1 Commonwealth v. Tuey, supra note 7, at 3.
14 Cf. Savage, The Charge to the Jury, in SEMI-
NAR ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 28 F.R.D. 37,
250-55 (1960).
15 See Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854
(5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Rogers, 289
F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961).
16 Suslak v. United States, 213 Fed. 913, 919
(9th Cir. 1914); accord, Shaffman v. United
States, 289 Fed. 370, 375 (3d Cir. 1923); State
v. Rodman, 208 La. 523, 23 So.2d 204 (1945).
17 31 U. Cnt. L. REV. 386, 389 (1964).
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struction, the right of the individual juror
to retain his conscientiously held viewpoint.
[T]he permissibility of a direction to jurors
to re-examine their views in the light of
those of their fellows is dependent upon
the moderating reminder of their own in-
dividual responsibility and the necessity
that any verdict be that of each of the
jurors and not just that of a majority.
When the moderating condition which
makes the direction to re-examine their
views permissible, and desirable in many
cases, is omitted, then the direction be-
comes so likely to be coercive, that a
verdict rendered promptly thereafter should
not be allowed to stand."'
It is common practice for a judge to ex-
hort a jury to reach a verdict, 19 but such
exhortation must meet the required stand-
ards.
It is proper for the judge to admonish
jurors who are in disagreement to re-
examine their opinions in light of the con-
trary opinions of their fellows, provided
it is made equally clear that the jury's
verdict must represent the final judgment
of each juror, and not merely his acquies-
cence in a majority view of which he re-
mains conscientiously unconvinced. 20
If the standards are shirked, the sanction
is reversal. Absent compliance with the
required standards, a minority member
might well take the charge as an invitation
to allow the majority to rule. 21
From the foregoing, it is apparent that
often the permissibility of the use of the
"Allen charge" might be seen as dependent
upon the use of a word or two, or even the
is United States v. Rogers, supra note 15, at 437.
19 Shoukatallie v. R., supra note 2, at 1001.
20 Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d
455, 463 (4th Cir. 1960).
21 E.g., United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433
(4th Cir. 1961).
tone of voice of the trial judge. It is not
illogical, therefore, that differing viewpoints
should be present side by side, as they are
in the instant case.
In Walker, the Court found that the use
of the "Allen charge" did not constitute re-
versible error. Determining that the charge
was not "one-sided," the Court held that
the giving of the charge was a proper exer-
cise of the trial judge's discretion.
In a separate opinion, Judge Brown ex-
pressed disapproval of the "Allen charge,"
stating that there was little justification for
its use. Quoting Mr. Justice Clark, he
stated: "Allen is dead and we do not be-
lieve in dead law." 22 Judge Brown consid-
ered the charge "in its operative purpose
and effect" 23 similar to the coercive com-
mon-law practices previously discussed. It
would appear that this absolute rejection of
the "Allen charge" is impractical. We need
look no further than the "object" of the
jury system, i.e., unanimity, and the meth-
od most appropriate for its achievement,
the supplemental instruction, to appreciate
this. Operating within the standards and
limits set down by the Supreme Court in
Allen, the charge is effective and serves its
purpose well.
Important to a consideration of the de-
cision in Walker were the circumstances
under which the charge was delivered. In
all previous cases the "Allen charge" was
given when the jury reported an inability
to agree-a deadlock. If the charge were
given before the report of the jury it was
grounds for reversal on appeal.14 The
22 Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22, 29 (5th
Cir. 1965) (separate opinion).
23 Ibid.
24E.g., Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1962); Powell v. United States, 297
F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1962).
"dynamite" was not to be "exploded before
there was any reason to think that blasting
was necessary. '2 5 At Walker's trial when
the court inquired whether the jury, after
four and one-half hours of deliberation, de-
sired any further assistance in regard to
the law, the foreman replied: "Your Hon-
or, we think we will reach a verdict soon.
We don't think we are very far from it."'26
There was obviously no deadlock. Yet, the
"Allen charge" was given.
A use of the charge, such as that
approved by the instant Court, is osten-
sibly contrary to established precedent. It
is true that precedent is often overturned,
just as it is true that dissenting opinions be-
come law. But it is rare that good law
evolves from a disregard of a sound judi-
cial premise. In Walker it seems that the
Court disregarded the relevant proposition
25 Green v. United States, supra note 24, at 856.
26 Walker v. United States, supra note 22, at 25.
First Conviction Under
New York Barratry Statute
Appellant was convicted of common
barratry on proof that he had personally,
with malicious intent, instituted nine
groundless claims, actions or legal pro-
ceedings against the complainant in small
claims and municipal courts. The Court of
Appeals, in affirming the first conviction
for barratry in the history of New York
State,1 held that Section 323 of the New
1 It is interesting to note that the appellant was
previously convicted of barratry in 1961. How-
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that "a verdict brought about by judicial
coercion is a nullity in the eyes of the
law."' 21 With proper and due deference to
the implication of the Court's instruction,
the minority juror could only comply by
yielding his conviction. Is this not an appli-
cation of pressure by the Court?
In his separate opinion, Judge Brown
quoted Judge Wisdom's opinion in Green
v. United States:28 "the Allen or 'dynamite'
charge is designed to blast loose a dead-
locked jury. . . . There is no justification
whatever for its coercive use." 29
The charge, as used in Walker, is appar-
ently improper. When functioning within
its limits, the "Allen charge" harmonizes
divergent views without unduly influencing
the minority juror. But when it exceeds
these limits, it is as offensive as the ancient
common-law practices.
27 Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157
A.2d 65 (1959).
28 Cases cited note 24 supra.
29 Green v. United States, supra note 24, at 854.
York Penal Law had modified the com-
mon-law rule so as to render one guilty of
common barratry who has himself, cor-
ruptly or maliciously instituted at least
three groundless actions or legal proceed-
ings.2 People v. Budner, 15 N.Y.2d 253,
206 N.E.2d 171, 258 N.Y.S.2d 73
(1965).
ever, the appellate division reversed upon a find-
ing, inter alia, that the prosecution had failed to
prove malice. People v. Budner, 13 App. Div.
2d 253, 215 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1st Dep't 1961).
2 Section 323 reads: "Upon a conviction for
common barratry, the fact that the defendant was
himself a party in interest or upon the record to
any action or legal proceeding complained of is
not a defense."
